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with violence and animal
rights in anthropology
Helen Kopnina
Leiden University, the Netherlands
Abstract
Anthropologists have mediated between discriminated communities and outsiders,
helping to influence public opinion through advocacy work. But can anthropological
advocacy be applied to the case of violence against nonhumans? Ethical inquiries in
anthropology also engage with the manifold ways through which human and nonhuman
lives are entangled and emplaced within wider ecological relationships, converging in the
so-called multispecies ethnography, but failing to account for exploitation. Reflecting on
this omission, this article discusses the applicability of engaged anthropology to the
range of issues from the use of nonhumans in medical experimentation and food pro-
duction industry, to habitat destruction, and in broader contexts involving violence
against nonhumans. Concluding that the existing forms of anthropological engagement
are inadequate in dealing with the massive scale of nonhuman abuse, this article will
suggest directions for a radical anthropology that engages with deep ecology, animal
rights, animal welfare, and ecological justice.
Keywords
Animal rights, animal welfare, conservation, deep ecology, ecological justice, multispe-
cies ethnography, radical anthropology
Introduction
Let me start this post with a vignette.
On 3 October 2015, at the plenary session of the German Association of
Anthropology in Marburg, at which I was the environmental anthropology’s
panel discussant, Nancy Scheper-Hughes presented a paper on organ extraction.
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Scheper-Hughes, who is part of a task force of social scientists and transplant
surgeons who have launched a global investigation of the organ trade, reported
her ongoing research on the global traffic in humans (living and dead) for their
organs to serve for international transplant patients. This presentation was given in
the context of transitional violence, justice, and reconciliation in the slums,
shantytowns, and squatter camps of Brazil and South Africa, scanning morgues,
prisons, and hospitals, investigating the finding and selling of human body parts for
transplantation. The emergences of robust bio-markets and global medical citizen-
ship have encouraged the spread of illicit global networks of trafficking in bodies,
dead and alive, whole and in parts.
The presentation was replete with images of organ extraction victims, mutilated
bodies, and close-ups of stitched skin surfaces, swollen faces with brains and eyes
pulled out, illustrating the horrendous legacy of an industry in organs that preys on
impoverished communities. Live donors, photographedbyScheper-Hughes,whohave
voluntarily offered one of their kidneys, have apparently indicated that they wanted to
sell more of whatever they had in two’s – their eyes or testicles. Driven to desperation,
Scheper-Hughes explained that they could not think beyond dire need. Dead bodies of
Brazilian street children who were killed for their organs, all covered in postmortem
bruises and abrasions, were displaced on a huge conference screen, bigger and bolder
than the newspaper images,which are often censored for shockingoroffensive content.
Scheper-Hughes has expressed hope that through anthropological evidence she can
help to protect the world’s poor from human rights abuses. She concluded:
I argue that heretical methods are needed. Radical anthropologists can make public
the convoluted and paradoxical forces that have created a world cut in two between
lives and bodies can be enhanced at the expense of others whose bodies don’t matter
except as a source of medical material.
The grim images, as well as Scheper-Hughes’ words, conveyed the speaker’s repul-
sion, empathetic pain, and condemnation that blurred the line between political
journalism, activism, and what can be termed ‘‘applied’’ or ‘‘engaged’’
anthropology.
The presentation stirred the audience to engage in a passionate discussion
shortly after the plenary session.
‘‘Horrible!’’ a German female conference participant has exclaimed. ‘‘They [the
organ extractors] are like animals!’’
‘‘What I don’t understand,’’ the other German female participant chimed in, ‘‘is
why there would be such a huge trade in human organs anyway? I heard that you
can perfectly well use animal organs – pig’s hearts, for example.’’
‘‘Yes, but that is more difficult,’’ explained an Austrian male participant. ‘‘The
human body rejects them sometimes . . . I think the best organs for human use are
those of chimpanzees.’’
One of the students who helped to organize this conference then wondered, ‘‘But
is it ethical?’’
334 Critique of Anthropology 37(3)
‘‘What would you rather do, keep killing humans?’’, exclaimed the German
speaker indignantly. ‘‘What next, doing medical experiments on humans?’’
Anthropologists like Scheper-Hughes have historically mediated between
communities and outsiders, helping to influence public opinion in favor of vul-
nerable communities through advocacy work (Lewis, 2005), particularly against
violence (e.g., Hastrup et al., 1990; Linstroth, 2015). Anthropologists have
paved the way for the robust critique of colonialism and racism (e.g., Cook,
2003; Maklouco-Maclay, 1876 in Parmentier and Kopnina-Geyer, 1996; Pels,
1997), and for acceptance of gender equality (e.g., Adams and Gruen, 2014;
Gaard, 1993; Plumwood, 1993). Yet, while anthropological advocacy of disad-
vantaged groups is well-established, one of the difficulties is that the subjects the
researcher speaks for could – and should – speak for themselves (Cohen, 1985).
But can anthropological advocacy be applied to the case of nonhumans, who
can never speak for themselves? Can ‘‘radical anthropology’’ condemn practices
in which animals routinely ‘‘donate’’ their lives and organs? Can ‘‘heretical
methods’’ be applied to other instances of nonhuman death, suffering, and
subordination?
The issue discussed here is the applicability of anthropology to the subject of use
and violence against nonhumans not on the case to case basis, as is typical in
anthropology, but in a broader context of industrial farming, medial testing, and
habitat destruction. This article will inquire how ‘‘traditional’’ anthropology of the
relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world deals with the issues
ranging from the use of animals within the medical and food production industries,
and in cases when habitat destruction causes biodiversity loss. Building on the exist-
ing forms of anthropological engagement, this article will suggest further directions
for a radical anthropology that engages with deep ecology, animal rights (ARs),
animal welfare (AW), and ecological justice to address nonhuman victimhood.
The central concepts and terms used in this article to underscore the issue of
violence against nonhumans are AR, AW, and ecological justice. Nonhumans will
be referred to here as animals and other living organisms, including plants and
fungi, as well as natural habitats that sustain them (e.g., Garner, 2015).
The need for discussing AR has originated from the realization of large-scale
abuse of animals (Regan, 1986; Singer, 1975). AR theorists and activists have a
range of ideas about ‘‘animal rights.’’ These various perspectives can be conceived
as a form of multiculturalism which is rooted in social justice, human rights and
citizenship, but also in ecological justice, aiming to contest status hierarchies that
have privileged hegemonic groups – both human and nonhuman, while stigmatiz-
ing minorities (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 2013). This progressive conception,
Kymlicka and Donaldson (2013) reflect, operates to illuminate unjust political
and cultural hierarchies, de-center hegemonic norms, and hold the exercise of
power morally accountable. Viewed this way, multiculturalism and ARs flow nat-
urally from the same deeper commitments to justice and moral accountability.
Special strategies for defending progressive causes, whether ARs or human
rights, against the danger of instrumentalization and cultural imperialism, have
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been developed (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 2013). AR strategies concern a com-
mitment to a number of goals, some of them stemming from the so-called aboli-
tionist perspective which is critical of animal experimentation and calls for the
dissolution of commercial animal agriculture, and elimination of commercial and
sport hunting (e.g., Kopnina and Gjerris, 2015; Regan, 1986; Singer, 1975). As
outlined by the World Animal Protection organization, ARs denote the philosoph-
ical belief that animals should have the right to live their lives free of human
intervention.
AW, at the very basic, refers to the disturbance of physiological systems to the
point that survival or reproduction is impaired). More broadly, concerns with AW
denote the desire to prevent unnecessary suffering, while not categorically opposed
to the use of animals, wanting to ensure a good quality of life and humane death
(WSPA).1 Though many AW proponents also believe animals deserve rights, the
question is about which animals deserve which rights is often disputed, with domes-
tic animals or pets sometimes given preference over wild animals or species
(Callicott, 1999).
Animal liberationists and deep ecology proponents care about different units –
entire species, or habitats, or individual animals, and sometimes come into conflict
(e.g., Garner, 2015; Nelson et al., 2016). Leopold’s and Singer’s positions have been
criticized for implying that single individuals can be sacrificed for the benefit of the
whole (Callicott, 1999; Hay, 2002). Conservation often aims to protect species
whereas AW protects individual animals. While AR and AW perspectives differ
in terms of units of concern (individual organisms vs. entire species), both rights
and welfare concerns overlap in the argument that the animals should be treated
justly because of their sentience and can experience pain and suffering (Singer,
1975). ‘‘Compassionate conservation’’ converge in recognition of individual ani-
mals as well as entire species (Nelson et al., 2016; Waldau, 2013). One of the
overarching concerns for both AR and AW proponents is the unfair treatment
of nonhumans, associated with concerns for ecological justice.2 Ecological justice
refers to interspecies equality3 and frames a number of concerns. These range from
the situation of animals used for medical and food production industries, as well as
that of wild animals (Baxter, 2005; Eckersley, 1995).
Framing anthropological work on nonhumans in terms of these concepts, this
article is structured in the following way. The section below briefly explores central
concepts in environmental ethics, followed by the discussion of anthropological
engagement with nonhumans on the level of individual animals, species, and habi-
tats. Consequent sections provide an excursion into an anthropocentric bias in
anthropology and outline a discussion of interdisciplinary engagements that
instruct the ethical ways forward in addressing nonhuman suffering.
Animals, organisms, species, and habitats: Ethical approaches
Some of the decidedly political fields emerging from AR and AW movements are
critical animal studies (e.g., Calarco, 2014; Taylor and Twine, 2014), interspecies
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solidarity (e.g., Coulter, 2015), and animal law (Peters, 2016). These streams are
rooted in ecocentric or biocentric perspective, which refers to the perception of
wholeness, founded on a distinct conception of who or what has intrinsic value –
individual organisms, species, habitats, or even the entire biosphere (Dunlap and
Van Liere, 1978). According to this perspective, actions should be judged on the
basis of their contribution to the stability of the ecological community. Leopold’s
(1949) Land Ethic urges the reader to ‘‘think like a mountain.’’This calls for envi-
sioning ecological processes as if one were the actual seat of the relationship
between wolves, deer grazing, vegetation, and erosion on the mountain’s slopes
(Descola, 2014). Following Leopold, Naess (1973) has assigned the intrinsic value
and moral rights to individual living organisms, including humans, and to collect-
ives such as species and ecosystems.
Ecosystems are seen as valuable due to their intrinsic worth, but also because of
their instrumental value as habitats for sentient beings (Eckersley, 1995; Gauger
et al., 2012). The idea of ‘‘earth rights’’ is instructive, as explicated by a Higgins
(2010) who has argued that ecocide, or direct or indirect killing of nonhumans,
needs to be considered as a legal crime. Ecocide refers to ‘‘the extensive destruction,
damage to or loss of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, whether by human agency or
by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of
that territory has been severely diminished’’ (Higgins, 2010). Crist (2012: 147)
unambiguously relates ecocide to genocide: ‘‘the mass violence against and exter-
mination of nonhuman nations, negating not only their own existence but also their
roles in Life’s interconnected nexus and their future evolutionary unfolding.’’
Despite some differences, the perspectives of ARs and ecological justice share a
unifying element of nonanthropocentric ethics, and concern for individual animals,
species, or entire habitats (Callicott, 1999; Kopnina and Gjerris, 2015; Waldau,
2013). Animal liberationists and environmental ethicists share concerns about the
entire ecosystems (Kopnina and Cherniak, 2016), often referred to as deep ecology.
Shallow and deep ecology (Naess, 1973) distinguishes between different motiv-
ations for environmental protection. Shallow ecologists protest overexploitation
of natural resources when these affect human welfare, while deep ecologists recog-
nize the intrinsic value and right to life and flourishing of nonhumans independent
of human interests.
Recently, a small number of anthropologists, along with the champions of AR
and environmental protection, have leveled criticism against the humanist
anthropocentric worldview for its presumption that only human beings are morally
considerable and that human rights trump those of other species (Sodikoff, 2011).
Within the larger discipline of anthropology and related fields, environmental or
ecological anthropology (e.g., Kopnina and Shoreman-Ouimet, 2011; Shoreman-
Ouimet and Kopnina, 2016) ‘‘more-than-human’’ geography (e.g., Whatmore,
2006), posthumanist anthropology (e.g., Fuentes, 2012; Rajagopalan, 2016;
Salazar Parreñas, 2015), and multispecies ethnography (e.g., Kirksey and
Helmreich, 2010; Ogden et al., 2013) have all addressed the complex relationship
between humans and nonhumans.
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Ingold (2012) defined ecological anthropology as a discipline that contextualizes
how ‘‘human beings and other organisms are bound in webs of life’’ (p. 428).
‘‘More-than-human’’ modes of enquiry are concerned with the material and eco-
logical fabric and the politics of knowledge through which this fabric is contested
and re-made, particularly in situations in which different ecological epistemologies
are brought into conflict (Whatmore, 2006). Posthumanist approach refers to the
project of ‘‘repopulating the social sciences with nonhuman beings, and thus of
shifting the focus away from the internal analysis of social conventions and insti-
tutions and toward the interactions of humans with (and between) animals, plants,
physical processes, artifacts, images, and other forms of beings’’ (Descola, 2014:
268). Violence against nonhumans has been discussed by anthropologists Desmond
(2013) in the case of roadkill, Kohn (2013) in the case of habitats (e.g., forests),
Strang (2013, 2016) in the case of social and ecological justice, and by Sodikoff
(2011), Rose and Van Dooren (2011), and Van Dooren (2014) in the case of extinc-
tion. Some authors started to pay more attention to nonhuman suffering in medical
research (e.g., Arluke, 1988; Nading, 2013; Rock, 2016). Many anthropologists
have contributed to collective encyclopedias of human–animal relationships (see,
e.g., volumes edited by Bekoff, 2013; Rose and Van Dooren, 2011; and Urbanik
and Johnston, 2016).
Reflecting on this ethical progress, Ogden et al. (2013) have optimistically
observed that the once radical positions advocated by a diverse AW movement
have now become the mainstream in anthropology and beyond. Kirksey and
Helmreich (2010) explore how animals are previously appearing on the margins
of anthropology– as part of the landscape, as food for humans, as symbols – have
been pressed into the foreground. The new kinds of relations emerging from non-
hierarchical alliances, symbiotic attachments, and interconnectivity of all species
characterized the emergence of multispecies ethnography (Kirksey and Helmreich,
2010: 546). Multispecies ethnography is credited to Haraway (2008) for taking
‘‘species’’ as a grounding concept for articulating biological difference and similar-
ity, with interspecies interactions seen in terms of interdependencies.
Hard realities
However, empirically, the mere scale of use, abuse, and dispossession of nonhu-
mans has only intensified as human population and consumption increased. It has
been estimated that every year about 100 million vertebrates are globally experi-
mented on (Taylor et al., 2008). In the United States, 1 million animals (excluding
rats, mice, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and animals used in agricultural experi-
ments), and an estimated 100 million mice and rats are used in medical experiments
(US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 2015;
PETA). According to People for Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) ‘‘each year,
more than 100 million animals – including mice, rats, frogs, dogs, cats, rabbits,
hamsters, guinea pigs, monkeys, fish, and birds – are killed in laboratories, medical
training, curiosity-driven experimentation, and chemical, drug, food, and cosmetics
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testing. Before their deaths, some are forced to inhale toxic fumes, others are
immobilized in restraint devices for hours, some have holes drilled into their
skulls, and others have their skin burned off or their spinal cords crushed.’’
For every medical test animal, tens time more are killed on the American roads
(Desmond, 2013; Scientific American, 2013). In comparison to those used in
research, over 1800 times the number of pigs are consumed for food, with 340
chickens consumed for each animal used for medical testing (National Agricultural
Statistics Service, 2016). More than 9,000,000,000 farm animals in the United
States are used annually to produce meat, dairy, and eggs (Humane Society).
Each year in the United States, approximately 2.7 million animals are euthanized,
including 1.2 million dogs and 1.4 million cats (ASPCA). While American and
European statistics are approximations of actual numbers, statistics on animal
consumption, experimentation, euthanasia, and roadkill in the rest of the
world are either not recorded or not accurate (Humane Society). Also for
biodiversity extinction rates, statistics widely vary, but the WWF estimates that
the loss of species is between 1000 and 10,000 times higher than the natural extinc-
tion rate (WWF).
This empirical reality overrides the idea of ‘‘moral progress’’ in relation to
nonhumans. As Marino and Mountain (2015) have emphasized, even though
today there are more animal advocacy and protection organizations than ever,
the situation for nonhuman animals continues to deteriorate, as illustrated by
intensification of factory farming and mass extinction of wildlife species.
Industrial farms or medical establishment where the most violence is institutiona-
lized and normalized are rarely questioned by the wider society and academics
(Crist, 2012). Mullin (1999) emphasizes that despite theoretical and ethical progress
in discussing these issues, anthropocentric focus in anthropology is unlikely to
disappear. While some anthropologists find PETA is a shocking, incendiary organ-
ization,4 from the AR point of view, it is no more shocking than a human rights
organization documenting the violence.
Anthropology and nonhumans
While anthropological studies frequently incorporate discussions of ethics into
their discipline (e.g., Caplan, 2003; Fassin, 2012), there has not been a moral
commitment comparable to the anthropologists’ unambiguous stance against
colonialism, apartheid, sexism, racism, and other instances of social injustices.
While there is a robust body of anthropological literature advocating for the
rights of vulnerable communities, colonized nations, and oppressed minorities,
human–animal oppression remains depoliticized. Only occasionally has the inter-
section between anthropology and nonanthropocentric ethics has been evoked as a
distinct line of inquiry to address the relationship between humans and animals
(e.g., Healy, 2007; King, 2013; Kopnina, 2012; Noske, 1992). Within this line of
inquiry, the intersection of medical and environmental anthropology, disease ecol-
ogy, pertinent to the vignette above has been developed (e.g., Arluke, 1988; Lieban,
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1990; Marshall, 1992; Nading, 2013; Rock, 2016). This intersection concerns
humans’ wellbeing which is seen as intimately dependent on the manifold ways
through which human and nonhuman lives are entangled and emplaced within
wider ecological relationships (e.g., Carrithers et al., 2011; Nading, 2013; Neves-
Graça, 2005). Nading (2013) argues that rather than highlighting fluidity among
individual bodies and variation within species, which are essential to biological
mutations and evolutionary theory, the disease ecologists have tended to regard
nonhuman species as homogenous things.
The ‘‘species turn’’ (Haraway, 2008) has been reflected in an increasing number
of publications, conference presentations and blogs involving multispecies ethno-
graphies. For example, the Engagement blog of the American Anthropological
Association has published a series of essays on the subject of multispecies ethno-
graphies. In the blog Reflections upon Seeing a Tiger in the Wild for the First Time
Margulies (2016) reflects: ‘‘I wish to simultaneously take seriously the material
power of signs of tigers and other animals across this contested landscape, and
how they are capable of producing new spatial relations between animals and
humans mediated by state relations with animals and animal symbols . . .’’
Here not much of a tiger is seen through the lens of academic reflexivity and sym-
bolism, similar to the ‘‘classical’’ conceptualization by Lévi-Strauss (1968).
The ‘‘agency’’ of a tiger as a living and feeling being is inevitably overshadowed
by the researcher’s (sympathetic) gaze. Realizing this, Margulies reflects:
As my narrative suggests, I was at first unable to see the living tiger itself but only the
tiger as symbol of itself within a Tiger Reserve, a spatial designation replete with
symbolic and powerfully political meanings. I see some potential for such auto-ethno-
graphic encounter narratives to develop as a creative method, or at least informative
practice, for interrogating inter-species politics and our position as researchers
attempting to study them.
Another example of the auto-ethnographic encounter narrative from the
Engagement blog is Salazar Parreñas’ (2015) description of a captured orangutan:
The orangutan herself was subjected to constraints of space rooted in colonial and
postcolonial histories of making territories. And those constraints were, for her, gen-
dered insofar that her sex affected her relationship to space. For instance, whenever
managers thought she should get pregnant, she would be forced into captivity with a
male orangutan for the purpose of procreation. (Salazar Parreñas, 2015)
In this quote, colonialism and gender preoccupation overshadow the simple fact
that the orangutan was caged and forced to mate.
Typically, such multispecies investigations fall short of recognizing ARs, only
touching upon AW. As Descola (2014: 269) noted the dealings of humans with
nonhumans through this symbolism impede the course of purging anthropology
from its anthropocentrism, ‘‘because nonhumans, devoid of linguistic abilities and
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capacities for symbolism, will always be the passive objects of human cognition and
inventiveness, mere bundles of qualities that humans detect and organize in sym-
bolic patterns.’’ Indeed, ‘‘if nonhumans must become agents in their own right,
then they have to be able to escape this symbol-induced passivity’’ (Descola, 2014:
269).
This symbol-induced passivity stems back to the nature-culture dualism or
human–environment dichotomy (Descola, 2013; Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina,
2015; Strang, 2016; Sullivan, 2016). Part of this dualistic vision presupposes that
nature or wilderness as socially constructed (e.g., Fletcher, 2015), denying nonhu-
man elements their agency and rights. Even when nature’s physical presence is
recognized, it is often merely as ‘‘background to the human drama which is
played out in a diversity of ways in different societies’’ (Kidner, 2016: 119).
Ingold has pointed out that even when the people anthropologists study claim
that their lives and practices follow from the features of their natural environment,
anthropologists tend to invert this relationship so that the natural world in effect
becomes an offshoot of the social (Ingold, 2000: 54). In fact, social construction of
nature obscures the grave damage done to nonhumans turning the debate to
constructivism (Kidner, 2016). Deconstructing dichotomy can place humans and
nonhumans in a zone of profound identity what Calarco (2014) called indistinction.
The term indistinction is illustrated within the category of meat, understood as a
zone of shared, exposed embodiment among human and animals. Indistinction can
be also related to the concept of entanglement (Van Dooren, 2014). Nading (2014:
11) defines entanglement as ‘‘the unfolding, often incidental attachments and affi-
nities, antagonisms and animosities that bring people, non-human animals and
things into each other’s worlds.’’ Accordingly, entanglement ‘‘is at once a material,
temporal and spatial condition’’ (Nading, 2014: 11).
Sensitive to realization of the nonhuman agency, Palmer et al. (2015) article, titled
‘‘Accessing Orangutans’ Perspectives’’ is instructed by empathy. The authors fol-
lowed the interdisciplinary methods of ethnoprimatology, using a combination of
ethnography and ethology to study orangutans’ relationships with one another and
caregivers’ interpretations of orangutans’ bonds at Auckland Zoo. The authors argue
that integrating ethnography with both qualitative and quantitative descriptions of
animal behavior can be useful for representing both species’ daily lives and for com-
paring interpretations obtained from different research methods. Palmer et al. suggest
that using empathy in research with animals goes some way toward acknowledging
animals’ agency and collapsing artificial dichotomy between us and them.
But erasing the human–environment dichotomy can raise uncomfortable ques-
tions, as demonstrated by an example of a gorilla shooting in the Cincinatti zoo in
May 2016, when the toddler fell into his cage and was attacked by the ape (Taylor,
2016). Some environmental philosophers contend that an individual member of an
endangered species is more valuable than an individual human being and that the
value of an individual decreases proportionately with the size of its population
(Taylor, 2016). Indeed, if the dual category of human and nonhuman is diffused,
shooting a gorilla and saving a toddler becomes problematic. And so does keeping
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apes in zoo in the first place. Should all animals be treated equally? When the
choice between a human and a member of the endangered species is made, what
protocol needs to be followed? Should anthropologists support the fact that pigs
can now be genetically modified to make them better donors for human transplants
(The Economist, 2015)? Obviously, an answer to this question is subject to value
judgments – of who is accorded rights, and by which human advocates – since
nonhumans cannot argue their own case. Unless multispecies ethnography is will-
ing to engage with such questions, it is likely to remain apolitical, without realizing
the exploitive nature of human–nonhuman relationship.
Another feature that is characteristic of the multispecies ethnographies is the
perception of the nonhuman wellbeing as a prerequisite of human health. For
example, Muenster and Schroer (2016) discuss ethical dimensions of what it
means to ‘‘live well’’ with other living beings, whose often hidden and invisible
‘‘work’’ is seen as crucial for the creation of human wellbeing. In this sense, ani-
mals, plants, fungi, and microbes are involved in creating and maintaining human
health, which is constituted through and depended on the active participation of
humans and nonhumans in shared social worlds (Muenster and Schroer, 2016). In
a similar way, Rock (2016) argues that environmental health justice in anthropol-
ogy underscores the importance of multi-species entanglements for preventing dis-
ease and promoting human well-being. Biomedical laboratories are presented as
networked places where select humans interact with select nonhuman animals
within spaces of multispeies entangelements (Davies, 2012; Rock, 2016). Yet,
these authors remain often oblivious to the nonconsensual, forced, and violent
nature of such ‘‘networked places’’ as medical laboratories. No questions are
asked about nonhuman wellbeing where elimination of ‘‘test subjects’’ after
organ extraction, described in the vignette above, are commonplace.
Anthropology, ecosystems, and conservation
While Leopold (1949) encourages the transposition of a relational experience to
habitats, so does Kohn (2013), in his well-received volume How Forests Think,
encourage the readers to imagine how entire habitats may ‘‘think’’ or ‘‘feel’’ or
‘‘dream.’’ Kohn reflects that ‘‘all beings, and not just humans, engage with the
world and with each other as selves, that is, as beings that have a point of view’’
(Kohn, 2013: 132). Kohn challenges a hierarchical value-ordering in western
thought regarding the relationships between humans and nonhumans, offering
alternative vision from the community that he studies, the Runa, as an example
of ontology that perceive nonhumans as imbued with agency and intentionality.
Thus, we need ‘‘to recognize the fact that seeing, representing, and perhaps know-
ing, even thinking, are not exclusively human affairs’’ (Kohn, 2013: 1).
While Kohn’s perspective is sympathetic to nonhumans, he does not take the
next step and relate his (and particularly Runa’s) engagement with forests to the
more uncomfortable questions related to instances when forest is removed, and
when the nonhuman forest inhabitants are threatened. A distinction remains
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between those that ‘‘do things’’ such as think, and those that are not: ‘‘life thinks;
stones don’t’’ (Kohn, 2013: 100).This perspective can, as Descola (2014) observes,
leave a great many nonhumans unaccounted for, since ‘‘the stones upon which I
stumble ‘do things’ in the world, so does an image of the Virgin, radioactivity, a
sundial, and many other ‘lifeless’ and ‘thoughtless’ objects’’ (p. 271). In much of
particularistic and place-based anthropology, the forest is not seen for the trees – or
for the people who relate to the trees.
Even less cognizant of how forests and their nonhuman inhabitants ‘‘think’’ and
‘‘feel’’ is the robust anthropological critique of biodiversity conservation within the
ecosystems. There is a tradition of anthropologists defending ‘‘cultural survival’’ of
indigenous practices including slash and burn agriculture, hunting or whaling
against the efforts of conservationists (e.g., Brockington, 2002; Einarsson, 1993;
Fletcher, 2015; Kalland, 2009; McElroy, 2013). A number of anthropologists have
critiqued neoliberalism within the global conservation movement attributing envir-
onmental defense to elitist sentiments (e.g., Brockington et al., 2008; Büscher et al.,
2012). In their ethnographies of whaling, Einarsson (1993), Kalland (2009), and
McElroy (2013) portray anti-whaling environmental organizations as imperialistic
and intolerant, trying to deprive the wailers of their natural resources. Benjaminsen
et al. (2006) argue that it is ethically problematic to privilege biodiversity protection
at the expense of poverty alleviation.
In his much-quoted article in the American Anthropologist, Kottak (1999: 33)
proclaimed:
Analysis of social forms should not be subordinated to approaches that emphasize the
environment at the expense of society and culture, and ecology over anthropology.
People must come first. Cultural anthropologists need to remember the primacy of
society and culture in their analysis and not be dazzled by ecological
data . . .Ecological anthropologists must put anthropology ahead of ecology.
Anthropology’s contribution is to place people ahead of plants, animals, and soil.
Following this lead, some anthropologists criticize prohibition of hunting as neo-
colonial (e.g., Einarsson, 1993; Kalland, 2009; McElroy, 2013), arguing against the
encroachment of exploitive wealthy elites that profit from conservation
(Brockington et al., 2008; Büscher et al., 2012; Fletcher, 2015). In fact, following
Kottak (1999) ‘‘ecological data’’ is willfully brushed aside. The preoccupation with
exclusively social ‘‘environmental justice’’ is evident in publications of Just
Conservation and Survival International and other initiatives that promote them-
selves as open forums for achieving conservation with justice. These forums are
used to ‘‘air grievances, concerns or experiences of conservation related human
rights abuses’’ that entirely ignore ecological justice.
The vulnerable communities are clearly identified as primary recipients of
anthropological support. Indeed, as the global elites live in perpetually unsustain-
able affluence, it is hard to argue that anyone should be prevented from enjoying
the immediate material benefits that these practices allow (Strang, 2013). Yet, while
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critique of elites that derive profit from conservation is a valid point, the question
that is not addressed is the efficacy of conservation in protecting nonhumans. While
the destructive reach of the corporate land grabbers and industrial developers is
globally profound, the local people, whose populations have been expanding, cause
deforestation by clearing forest for subsistence agriculture and fuel, or hunting for
‘‘bushmeat,’’ leading to the ‘‘empty forest syndrome’’ (Peterson, 2013). The critics
of conservation rarely address the fact that restoration of depleted habitats can
help break the vicious spiral in which the poor are forced to overuse natural
resources, which in turn further impoverishes them (Elliott, 2013), not to mention
offer protection to the critically endangered species. Thus, a thorny question
remains as to whether anyone, rich or poor, has the right to priorities their own
interests to the extent that those of the nonhuman are deemed expendable (Strang,
2013). To quote Crist (2015: 93):
The literature challenging traditional conservation strategies as locking people out,
and as locking away sources of human livelihood, rarely tackles either the broader
distribution of poverty or its root social causes; rather, strictly protected areas are
scapegoated, and wild nature, once again, is targeted to take the fall for the purported
betterment of people, while domination and exploitation of nature remain unchal-
lenged. The prevailing mindset of humanity’s entitlement to avail itself of the natural
world without limitation is easily, if tacitly, invoked by arguments that demand that
wilderness . . . offer up its ‘‘natural resources’’ – in the name of justice.
More subtly, the anthropological rendering of wildlife killing is carefully crafted in
terms of aesthetics or cultural practices. Anthropologists discuss poetics, language
and interpretation, embracing the narratives of ‘‘mutual ecologies’’ (Fuentes,
2012). In relation to whaling Neves-Graça (2005) speaks of ‘‘whaler aesthetics
that entail a holistic epistemology.’’ These ‘‘ecological aesthetics’’ and ‘‘poetics of
whaling’’ tend to obscure not only the point that ARs activists are making but the
very the act of violence and actual killing of whales by ‘‘social actors.’’ This is a
very different ecological anthropology than the ‘‘interconnectiveness’’ emphasized
by Ingold (2012).
Anthropology and victimhood: Bottlenecks and paradoxes
While purportedly defending vulnerable, poor communities, excluding nonhumans
from this concern testifies to the double standard morality. While colonial
elites have prohibited the practice of tribal warfare, torture, and cannibalism
(e.g., Goldman, 1999), few anthropologists would decry the loss of these ‘‘trad-
itional practices.’’ Simultaneously, ARs activists are seen as threatening ‘‘cultural
survival.’’ Critics of conservation tend to conflate environmentalism with coloni-
alism, while implicitly supporting colonial prohibition of headhunting as part of
traditional ritual, or infanticide as part of traditional birth control. The very idea of
‘‘traditional practice’’ is thus selectively framed.
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It is also ironic that the defenders of ‘‘indigenous rights’’ often adopt the ‘‘non-
traditional’’ commercial terminology in referring to natural resources and ecosys-
tem services (Benjaminsen et al., 2006). As Pountney (2012: 215) has pointed out:
Arne Kalland’s critique of the discrete categorisation of people into those who whale
culturally (Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling) and those who whale commercially with-
out cultural values indicates that the two cannot be meaningfully separated.
‘‘Indigenous people’’ are rarely isolated from global market forces and for coastal
whalers whaling is more than a mode of subsistence. However, the author undermined
his argument in two ways. First, by polarising the debate and vilifying the opposition
(an accuse he himself moves to the anti-whaling environmentalists). Second, by using
selective pieces of information, emotive language and at times crude generalisations, it
becomes increasingly difficult for the reader to appreciate how the author differs from
the people he is decrying . . .. The book reads more like a smear campaign than an
exploration of social engagement with whaling.
This sets a dangerous precedent in reifying ‘‘cultural survival’’ and economic live-
lihood at the cost of nonhuman lives. Today, there is a growing proportional
difference between the number of people (over 7 billion) and a number of nonhu-
mans, especially apex predators, such as tigers and lions, left in the wild. While the
apex predators are normally checked by environmental constraints, this is no
longer the case for our own species. It seems that ‘‘the bigger the population, the
faster it grows; the more technology we have, the faster the rate of new invention;
and the more we believe in our ‘power’ over an enemy environment, the more
‘power’ we seem to have and the more spiteful the environment seems to be’’
(Bateson, 1972: 494). As observed by Crist (2012: 145): ‘‘as civilized Man’s
power over the natural world has grown, so by the same token has his blindness
to the wonder of the biosphere’s existence as well as to the grievous violence he has
unleashed within it.’’ Simultaneously, ‘‘with the animals in our laps and our
mechanized slaughterhouses, we are less sure who they are and therefore who we
are’’ (Shepard, 1993: 289).
Discussing the issue of farm animals might be even more uncomfortable than
harm wrought against animals in the wild since it is intertwined with the questions
of social justice and growing global demands for affordable food for an increasing
number of people. This demand drives the increased use of confined animal feeding
operations (CAFOs), in conditions that can be described as animal torture (Crist,
2012) in order to increase the economic efficiency of meat production (Lobao and
Stofferahn, 2008). This efficiency in intertwined with other ethical questions, such
as availability of affordable food for all people, including those who cannot afford
the meat that is produced in more animal-friendly conditions (Haraway, 2008).
As Haraway (2008: 41–42) has reflected:
In principle if not always in personal and collective action, it is easy to know that
factory farming and its sciences and politics must be undone. But what then? How can
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food security for everybody (not just for the rich, who can forget how important cheap
and abundant food is) and multispecies’ co-flourishing be linked in practice?
Thus, the trade-offs, potential conflicts, as well as the need to compromise is once
again centered on vulnerable human communities and not about other living
beings. The unproblematic category of ‘‘meat’’ clearly applies to nonhumans
only, and the choice is often framed between people, not between people and
nonhumans (Calarco, 2014).
Plumwood (2000) reflects on after her experience of almost being swallowed by a
crocodile, and the ‘‘shocking reduction’’ suffered from realizing that she can be
seen as a piece of meat, conveys this sense of true unity with nonhumans that is not
common in anthropological literature. Routney’s (1982) paper ‘‘In Defense of
Cannibalism’’ which has caused an academic outcry of indignation at the time of
its publication demonstrates the great gap between moral values assigned to the
lives and bodies of humans and animals.
Another example of the double standard is the case of medical experimentation.
Rightly the horrors of the Nazi-era medical testing on human prisoners have
caused the global abhorrence. Yet, very few anthropologists dispute the use of
medical testing on animals. Haraway reflects on her exchange with her friend
and colleague Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi who has asked her:
So if you were going to abandon humanism, in favor of the post-humanism, ahuman-
ism, non-humanism of the process philosophers, of the phenomenologists, of Derrida
and Whitehead, I still want to know how specifically laboratory experimental prac-
tices get done and get justified . . .. I want to know what you would say when someone
buttonholes you and says: I challenge you to defend the slaughter of lab animals in
biomedical experiments. (Ghamari-Tabrizi in Haraway, 2008: 86–87)
Haraway (2008: 86–87) responded:
Yes, I will defend animal killing for reasons and in detailed material-semiotic condi-
tions that I judge tolerable because of a greater good calculation. And no, that is never
enough. I refuse the choice of ‘‘inviolable animal rights’’ versus ‘‘human good is more
important.’’ Both of those proceed as if calculation solved the dilemma, and all I or we
have to do is choose. I have never regarded that as enough in abortion politics either.
Because we did not learn how to shape the public discourse well enough, in legal and
popular battles feminists have had little choice but to use the language of rationalist
choice as if that settled our prolife politics, but it does not and we know it . . .. We
feminists who protect access to abortion, we who kill that way, need to learn to
revoice life and death in our terms and not accept the rationalist dichotomy that
rules most ethical dispute.
Perhaps guilty of the ‘‘rationalist dichotomy’’ thinking, I fail to see how the
‘‘material-semiotic conditions’’ apply to the feminist argument about ‘‘killing’’ in
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the case for (or against) abortion. A human embryo is not ‘‘killed’’ for the ‘‘greater
good,’’ if the ‘‘greater good’’ (as in the case of animal testing) implies human
welfare. Abortion is normally done with the consent of a mother, which cannot
be said of nonhuman mothers who are exposed to human-related diseases,
subjected to experimental treatments and then exterminated, pregnant or not.
Even our beloved pets, who generally tend to receive more recognition and
better treatment than do animals used for food production (Haraway, 2008),
have their reproductive choices determined by their owners (e.g., sterilization
and castration of pets is common practice). More generally, ecofeminism has expli-
citly linked subordination of nature to gender oppression (e.g., Adams and Gruen,
2014; Gaard, 1993; Plumwood, 1993), without realizing that for nonhumans this
oppression is a question of life and death.
Haraway (2008: 88) continues: ‘‘Far from reducing everything to a soup of post-
(or pre-) modern complexity in which anything ends up permitted, companion-
species approaches must actually engage in cosmopolitics, articulating bodies to
some bodies and not others, nourishing some worlds and not others, and bearing
the mortal consequences.’’ In the same paragraph she adds: ‘‘All of this is what I
am calling ‘sharing suffering’. It is not a game but more like what Charis
Thompson calls ontological choreography’’ (Haraway, 2008: 88).
I wonder how nonhumans are to engage in cosmopolitics if they cannot speak
our language, and would the inevitable choice of ‘‘nourishing some worlds and not
others’’ fall upon those who can talk? By default, will not the ‘‘bearing the mortal
consequences’’ be done by nonhumans? This muddled justification for not making
a choice actually allows those in power to make it anyway.
The lack of moral commitment is exemplary of how multispecies anthropology
deals – or rather refuses to deal with – nonhuman suffering. While being sympa-
thetic to nonhumans, Haraway does not take a stance the way that she does against
oppression of women in much of her work. This double standard allows dismissal
of anything from the production of meat (which, according to humanist logic, has
to be cheaply produced) to conservation (which has to, according to the same logic,
be primarily fair to vulnerable human communities). When arguing that more
attention ought to be paid to life forms, even Ingold does not pose questions
about suffering (Rock, 2016).
An excursion into anthropocentric bias in our discipline
Since this article critiques the current dominant conception of the human relation-
ship with the nonhuman world, anthropocentrism needs to be explained in more
detail. Anthropocentrism is often associated with ‘‘humanism,’’ a worldview which
privileges the aim of improvement of human welfare. Humanism has long been a
tenet of socio-cultural anthropology and has underwritten efforts to expose social
injustices and improve the welfare of all human beings (Sodikoff, 2011). Humanism
has also become part of the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) in Western society,
positing humans as superior to nature (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978). Within DSP,
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the uniqueness of human beings is manifested in their capacity to effectively control
natural resources and use language and technology. The DSP is distinguished by
anticipations of continuous abundance and prosperity, achieved through science,
technology, and economic growth (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978). DSP is similar to
Horkheimer and Adorno’s (2002) notion of ‘‘rational sovereignty’’ of the post-
Enlightenment period when humankind has achieved the ‘‘mastery’’ of Nature,
manifesting itself in the ever-expanding industrial economy.
It was argued that extreme cultural relativity, in which it is possible to ignore
major abuses of human rights, is an abdication of moral responsibility (Caplan,
2003). By the same token, ignoring the scale of nonhuman suffering in favor of case
studies can be seen as abdication of moral responsibility to nonhumans. Kohn’s
idea of autonomy and intrinsic rights of forests, trees, or animals is largely
restricted to the ‘‘native view’’ of the Runa community that he studies. This view
is typical of much anthropological writing about community perspectives on
biodiversity, exploring knowledge systems of indigenous peoples within specific
settings (Descola, 2014). Indeed, many anthropologists have pointed out that indi-
genous worldviews can have radically different ontologies and epistemologies from
Western dualism and cautioned against reproduction of western concepts and
taxonomies of nature (Descola, 2014; Ingold, 2000, 2012; Kopnina, 2015;
Sullivan, 2016).
Perhaps due to the tradition of the case-based studies in anthropology, few
anthropologists have engaged with the massive scale of nonhuman abuse, or
with the more radical ecocentric positions. While indigenous ontologies are
highly valuable, it has been argued that rather than being due to the ecologically
benign ontologies, the low ecological impact within traditional societies has been
due to structural factors such as low population density and poor production
technology (Ingold, 2000). Also, in the context of planetary biodiversity loss, the
local ontologies are not always ecologically benign. When the people anthropolo-
gists study indicate that they would rather hunt (endangered species), anthropo-
logical critiques of conservation not only represent this view, but actively advocate
on behalf of ‘‘their’’ communities against the efforts of those who try to protect the
nonhumans (e.g., Einarsson, 1993; Kalland, 2009; McElroy, 2013).
But it is not just the overt critics of conservation that justify anthropocentrism
by declaring their support for the vulnerable communities. The well-meant reci-
procity, interconnectedness, and entanglements rhetoric tends to ignore the history
of human-driven extinctions, and the Thylacine (Tasmanian tiger), the Passenger
Pigeon, and the Golden Toad, to name just a few extinct species, remain outside of
these narratives. While we may all remember ‘‘the last of the Mohicans’’ will we
ever remember the Golden Toad?
The rhetoric of diffusing human–environment dualism does not go far enough in
addressing underlying anthropocentrism. While many anthropologists criticize the
heritage of Western philosophy, science, and law that all presume a hierarchal
distinction between human and nonhuman lives (Descola, 2013; Rock, 2016),
anthropocentric bias (Kopnina, 2016), speceism (King, 2013) and human
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exceptionalism (Haraway, 2008; Mullin, 1999) positions are still dominant. The
practical choice between a gorilla (not to mention a mosquito) and a human is
easily made.
Stating this is not a question of demonizing humans but of realizing that the
relationship between nonhumans and humans is not reciprocal. There are signifi-
cant distinctions being made between human groups (e.g., those deserving of
anthropological sympathy by the virtue of being assigned ‘‘poor,’’ ‘‘marginalized,’’
‘‘indigenous,’’ or ‘‘minority’’ status; and those to blame: capitalists, neoliberals,
conservationists). Yet, a clear moral demarcation between humans (in all their
diversity) and nonhumans (as a collective without rights) is retained. It is not the
question of whether humans are interconnected with or interdependent with nature
(of course they are, as slave owners were also dependent on their slaves), but
whether nature should be accorded rights similar to that of humans.
Multispecies ethnography has largely steered away from ARs, too academic to
be truly political.
Ways forward: Interdisciplinary directions
Some anthropologists have paved the way as to how the responsibility for nonhu-
man suffering can be assumed. Milton (2002) has spoken of ‘‘loving nature’’ as a
cross-culturally present remedy to nature/culture divide. Noske (1992), King (2013)
and Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina (2015, 2016) have opened up new possibilities
for non-anthropocentric anthropology. Strang (2016) has argued that we need a
broader conception of environmental justice which encompasses justice between
species. If we plan to address ecological justice as a secondary issue, after the social
injustice is ‘‘solved,’’ few wild and free nonhumans are likely to remain on this
planet.
Rajagopalan (2016) suggests that anthropologists could act as translators
between, for example, the bees, the bee keepers and those that control global
agricultural markets. She asks to what extent anthropologists can negotiate the
taking-seriously of other-than-humans so that it is practically useful for all life.
Might a researcher or senior executive working in Monsanto authentically encoun-
ter the Great Spirit of the Beehive and how could such an interchange affect the
kind of work that an agricultural scientist or entomologist might produce?
The next step for sympathetic anthropologists who recognize animal selfhood,
sentience, and agency as well as biologically determined instincts, interests, and
natures, and believe that they should be permitted to live their lives free from
avoidable suffering, is to broaden their interdisciplinary involvement to less main-
stream key areas. As mainstream environmentalists have become ‘‘much more
sensitive, well behaved, well spoken,’’ radical environmentalism that seeks to
address large scale suffering is among the least understood of all contemporary
opposition movements, not only in tactical terms, but also ethically and philosoph-
ically (Best and Nocella, 2011). Understanding these movements can lead to the
radical reform, as in the case of social liberation movements, including the
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abolition of slavery, and to legal progress supporting gender and racial equality.
In order to enable a similar ethical shift in the case of nonhumans, closer engage-
ment with critical animal studies (e.g., Calarco, 2014; Taylor and Twine, 2014),
interspecies solidarity (e.g., Coulter, 2015), AW and ARs (Regan, 1986; Singer,
1975), ecological justice (Baxter, 2005; Higgins, 2010) and animal law (Peters, 2016)
can be instructive as they radically undercut the human–environment dichotomy.
Concretely, an implication of Singer’s focus on the sentience of animals is the need
to minimize suffering, and that human beings must justify their interference with
nature. The Great Apes Project, for example, is lobbying to include a wide range of
simians in the ‘‘community of equals’’ with humans, thus extending the right to life,
the protection of individual liberty, and the prohibition of torture.
Part of confronting the violence includes recognition that nonhumans do com-
municate and share a number of unique psychological characteristics. This is long
ago accepted in evolutionary theory – but is only marginally recognized in anthro-
pology. Indeed, the biologically grounded ontologies of being can lead towards
more sensitive attunements with nonhumans (Haraway, 2008; Sullivan, 2016).
Based on this realization, critical animal studies recognize that animals are not
voiceless; they simply do not share a full verbal language with humans (Taylor
and Twine, 2014). In resisting both anthropomorphizing and the ‘‘naturalizing’’ of
animals, Noske (1992) argues, we need to develop an anthropology of the other
animals that encounters them on their terms.
Pragmatically, recognizing that some objects have an agency does not yet say
how they should be treated, and thus animal law (Peters, 2016) is very instructive
for politically engaged radical anthropology. Ecological justice needs to be
embedded in political, legal structures and – last but not least – in culture including
academic culture. The key role that culture plays in environmental protection dem-
onstrates anthropology’s direct relevance to environmentalism and its analysis
(Milton, 1996 in Efird, 2016). Without engaging political, legal, and ethical dis-
courses centered on animals as valuable in their own right, multispecies ethnog-
raphy – or for that matter, any anthropology of nonhumans, will remain
depoliticized and disengaged.
Returning to Haraway (2008), ‘‘shared suffering’’ might imply volunteering our-
selves as human test subjects, consenting to be postmortem meat donors, prohibit-
ing zoo keeping or factory farming, and supporting vegetarian diets and
communities that practice them. In the case of conservation, place-specific policies
favoring participation of local communities, or, the less desired, fencing off of
nature areas, or even the corporate ownership of nature resorts needs to be con-
sidered if survival of nonhuman species is to be taken seriously. In the case of
biomedical research, animal testing might have to be entirely reconsidered.
To paraphrase Ghamari-Tabrizi challenge and stripping away layers of theories
I challenge anthropologists to take a clear stand. Rather than asking why ARs
should be considered, it is more essential to ask: why shouldn’t they? What mor-
ality, other than ‘‘might makes right’’ can justify nonhuman subordination? It is
this type of questioning that needs to be evoked if the multispecies anthropology is
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to move beyond mere theorizing and ‘‘ontological choreography’’. The well-mean-
ing but essentially apolitical academic excursions into multispecies ethnography
may need to address multispecies injustice, suffering, and unidirectional violence.
An ethical vigor and clear commitment characteristic of the tradition of social
advocacy in anthropology is urgently needed.
Conclusion
What Scheper-Hughes has described is horrendous and anthropologists should
indeed actively work against the terrifying trade in organs, particularly as anthro-
pologists have an ethical disposition toward oppressed, downtrodden, and margin-
alized communities. Yet, if the acceptance of daily animal suffering is to be
challenged, real anthropological engagement or even activism is needed. While
the rhetoric of entanglements is sympathetic to nonhumans, it remains largely
conventional in its micro-analysis of ‘traditional’ anthropological communities,
local perceptions and experiences, failing, as it were, to see the forest for the
trees. Much of the recent multispecies scholarship has remained rooted in comfort-
able intellectual and ethical spaces, addressing political issues in a local context and
leaving the immensity of the global nonhuman abuse outside the scope of engaged
anthropology. In times of industrialization of animal suffering, anthropology needs
to transcend ‘‘a soup of post- (or pre-) modern complexity’’ (Haraway, 2008: 88).
While the commitment to the advocacy of ecological justice, deep ecology, and
AR seems radical and heretical, so was the commitment to minority rights in the
past. As Scheper-Hughes has argued, radical anthropology and heretical methods
are needed when we feel truly moved by cases of suffering and violence. To repeat
the student’s question quoted in the vignette above: is the use of animals in medical
experimentation moral? This article has argued that it is time for anthropologists to
take a stance on ARs.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.
Notes
1. Animal right supporters are philosophically opposed to the use of animals by humans,
although some accept ‘symbiotic’ relationships, such as companion animal ownership.
The animal welfare includes the following:
« Freedom from hunger and thirst
« Freedom from discomfort, including shelter
« Freedom from pain, injury, and disease
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« Freedom to express normal behavior, including sufficient space and company of
the animals own kind
« Freedom from distress by ensuring conditions and treatment which avoid suffering
(WSPA).
2. Animal rights theory has a complex line of descent that includes a combination of
Bentham’s utilitarianism, and Kantian natural rights, as well as theories of duty and
autonomy. Discussion of animal rights stems from Singer (1975) and Regan (1986) and
involves a combination of both liberty and claim rights.
3. Various application of this theory explore the nature of justice claims as applied to
organisms of various degrees of complexity and describes the institutional arrangements
necessary to integrate the claims of ecological justice into human decision-making.
4. This comment on PETA was issued by the editors of the Engagement blog of the
American Anthropological Association, when the author attempted to publish a blog
in the thematic issue titled ‘‘Beyond Multispecies Ethnographies’’ in 2015 (e-mail from
editors of Engagement blog, personal communication). This blog has been published on
the author’s university website (anonymous author link).
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Büscher B, Sullivan S, Neves K, et al. (2012) Towards a synthesized critique of neoliberal
biodiversity conservation. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(2): 4–30.
Calarco R (2014) Being toward meat: Anthropocentrism, indistinction, and veganism.
Dialectical Anthropology 38(4): 415–429.
Callicott JB (1999) Moral monism in environmental ethics defended. In: Callicott JB (ed.)
Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, pp. 171–183.
352 Critique of Anthropology 37(3)
Caplan P (2003) The Ethics of Anthropology: Debates and Dilemmas. Routledge: New York.
Carrithers M, Bracken LJ and Emery S (2011) Can a species be a person? A trope and its
entanglements in the anthropocene era. Current Anthropology 52(5): 661–685.
Cohen AP (1985) Symbolic Construction of Community. New York: Routledge.
Crist E (2012) Abundant earth and population. In: Cafaro P and Crist E (eds) Life on the
Brink: Environmentalists Confront Overpopulation. Atlanta: University of Georgia Press,
pp. 141–153.
Crist E (2015) I walk in the world to love it. In: Wuerthner G, Crist E and Butler T (eds)
Protecting the Wild: Parks and Wilderness, The Foundation for Conservation.
Washington/London: The Island Press, pp. 82–95.
Cook SR (2003) Anthropological advocacy in historical perspective: The case of anthro-
pologists and Virginia Indians. Human Organization 62(2): 193–201.
Coulter K (2015) Animals, Work and the Promise of Interspecies Solidarity. Springer.
Available at: http://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781137558800.
Davies G (2012) Caring for the multiple and the multitude: Assembling animal welfare and
enabling ethical critique. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30: 623–638.
Descola P (2013) Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Descola P (2014) All too human (still): A comment on Eduardo Kohn’s how forests think.
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4(2): 267–273.
Desmond J (2013) Requiem for roadkill: Death and denial on America’s roads. In: Kopnina
H and Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) Environmental Anthropology: Future Directions. New
York and Oxford: Routledge, pp. 46–58.
Donaldson S and Kymlicka W (2013) Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Dunlap RE and Van Liere KD (1978) The new environmental paradigm: A proposed
measuring instrument and preliminary results. The Journal of Environmental Education
9: 10–19.
Eckersley R (1995) Liberal democracy and the rights of nature: The struggle for inclusion.
Environmental Politics 4(4): 169–198.
The Economist (2015) No pig in a poke: Genome engineering may help make porcine organs
suitable for use in people. Avalable at: www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/
21674493-genome-engineering-may-help-make-porcine-organs-suitable-use-people-no-pig
Efird R (2016) Perceiving nature’s personhood: Anthropological enhancements to environ-
mental education. In: Kopnina H and Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) The Handbook of
Environmental Anthropology. New York: Routledge, pp. 441–451.
Einarsson N (1993) All animals are equal but some are cetaceans: Conservation and culture
conflict. In: Milton K (ed.) Environmentalism: The View from Anthropology. New York:
Routledge, pp. 73–84.
Elliott J (2013) An Introduction to Sustainable Development. London: Routledge.
Fletcher R (2015) Nature is a nice place to save but I wouldn’t want to live there:
Environmental education and the ecotourist gaze. Environmental Education Research
21(3): 338–350.
Fassin D (ed.) (2012) A Companion to Moral Anthropology. John Wiley & Sons.
Fuentes A (2012) Ethnoprimatology and the anthropology of the human–primate interface.
Annual Review of Anthropology 41: 101–117.
Gaard G (1993) Living interconnections with animals and nature. Ecofeminism: Women,
Animals, Nature 1–12.
Kopnina 353
Garner R (2015) Environmental politics, animal rights and ecological justice. In: Kopnina H
and Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) Sustainability: Key Issues. New York: Routledge Earthscan.
Gauger A, Rabatel-Fernel MP, Kulbicki L, et al. (2012) The Ecocide Project. Ecocide
is the Missing 5th Crime Against Peace. School of Advanced Study University of London.
Goldman LR (1999) The Anthropology of Cannibalism. Westport: Bergin and Garvey.
Haraway D (2008) When Species Meet (Posthumanities). Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Hastrup K, Elsass P, Grillo R, et al. (1990) Anthropological advocacy: A contradiction in
terms? Current Anthropology 31(3): 301–311.
Hay P (2002) A Companion to Environmental Thought. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Healy S (2007) Deadly dingoes: ‘Wild’ or simply requiring ‘due process’? Social Studies of
Science 37(3): 443–471.
Higgins P (2010) Eradicating Ecocide: Laws and Governance to Prevent the Destruction of
Our Planet. London: Shepheard Walwyn Publishers Ltd, pp. 62–63.
Horkheimer M and Adorno T (2002 [1944]) Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York:
Cumming Continuum.
Humane Society. Available at: www.humanesociety.org/news/resources/research/stats_
slaughter_totals.html.
Ingold T (2000) The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill.
London: Routledge.
Ingold T (2012) Toward an ecology of materials. Annual Review of Anthropology 41:
427–442.
Kalland A (2009) Unveiling the Whale: Discourses on Whales and Whaling. Oxford:
Berghahn Books.
Kidner D (2016) An anthropology of nature – Or an industrialist anthropology?
In: Kopnina H and Shoreman-Ouimet E (eds) The Handbook of Environmental
Anthropology. New York: Routledge, pp. 119–131.
King B (2013) Anthropological perspectives on ignoring nature. In: Bekoff M (ed.) Ignoring
Nature No More: The Case for Compassionate Conservation. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, pp. 201–210.
Kirksey S and Helmreich S (2010) The emergence of multispecies ethnography. Cultural
Anthropology 25(4): 545–576.
Kohn E (2013) How Forests Think. Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Kopnina H (2012) Towards conservational anthropology: Addressing anthropocentric bias
in anthropology. Dialectical Anthropology 36(1): 127–146.
Kopnina H (2015) Revisiting the Lorax complex: Deep ecology and biophilia in cross-
cultural perspective. Environmental Sociology 43(4): 315–324.
Kopnina H (2016) Half the earth for people (or more)? Addressing ethical questions in
conservation. Biological Conservation 203(2016): 176–185.
Kopnina H and Cherniak B (2016) Neoliberalism and Justice in Education for Sustainable
Development: A call for inclusive pluralism. Environmental Education Research 22(6):
827–841.
Kopnina H and Gjerris M (2015) Are some animals more equal than others? Animal rights
and deep ecology in environmental education. Canadian Journal of Environmental
Education 20: 109–123.
354 Critique of Anthropology 37(3)
Kopnina H and Shoreman-Ouimet E (2011) Environmental Anthropology Today. New York:
Routledge.
Kottak CP (1999) The new ecological anthropology. American Anthropologist 101(1): 35.
Leopold A (1949) A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There. New York: Oxford
University Press.
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